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STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
I. Whether the district court erred when it imposed a three-year suspension upon 
the Respondent, Jonathan W. Grimes, when the court found that Mr. Grimes 
had committed misconduct when handling the funds of his client, but also found 
compelling mitigating circumstances. 
II. In reviewing sanctions imposed for attorney discipline actions, the Court should 
presume the findings of fact in the lower court are correct. See Matter of 
Discipline ofBabilis, 951 P.2d 207 (Utah 1997). The court should not overturn 
findings of fact unless "unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or plainly in error." 
See id. If the evidence warrants, the Court may make an independent judgment 
regarding the appropriate level of discipline, but the Court should "always give 
serious consideration to the findings and rulings of the district court." See id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following rules of professional conduct are at issue in this action: 
Rule 1.2 (Scope of Representation), Rules of Professional Conduct 
Rule 1.3 (Diligence), Rules of Professional Conduct 
Rule 1.4 (Communication), Rules of Professional Conduct 
Rule 1.5 (Fees), Rules of Professional Conduct 
Rule 8.4 (Misconduct), Rules of Professional Conduct 
Rule 14-603 (Sanction), Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
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Rule 14-604 (Imposition of Sanctions), Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
Rule 14-607 (Aggravation and Mitigation), Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: This is an appeal from an attorney discipline action in which the 
district court suspended the Respondent, Jordan W. Grimes, for three years after finding that he 
engaged in misconduct when handling $7,070 in fees paid by one of his clients. Although Judge 
L.A. Dever recognized that the presumptive sanction for Mr. Grimes' conduct was disbarment, 
Judge Dever found the mitigating circumstances compelling enough to warrant imposing a three-
year suspension with specific probationary terms instead. The Office of Professional Conduct 
(OPC) initiated this appeal, arguing Judge Dever erred when departing from the presumptive 
sanction in response to mitigating circumstances. 
The Course of Proceedings: The OPC filed a complaint against Mr. Grimes on June 20, 
2008. On June 2, 2010, the district court presided over a trial to determine whether Mr. Grimes 
violated the Rules of Professional Conduct ("Rules"). The district court found that Grimes 
violated Rules 1.2(a) (Scope of Representation); 1.3 (Diligence); 1.4(a) (Communication); 1.5(a) 
(Fees); 8.4(a),(c), and (d) (Misconduct), and issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
The matter then proceeded to a sanctions hearing on November 8, 2010. 
Disposition in the Trial Court: At the Sanctions hearing, the district court heard 
evidence of the mitigating circumstances at issue during the period of Mr. Grimes' misconduct. 
On February 4, 2011, the court issued an Order of Sanction imposing a three-year suspension 
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rather than disbannent, in light of the mitigating circumstances and in the interest of justice. The 
court also imposed probation on Mr. Grimes, during which he was to reimburse his client for the 
misused funds, complete an ethics and professional conduct course acceptable to the OPC, and 
report to a supervising attorney selected by OPC. Upon returning to active practice, Mr. Grimes' 
client funds are to be monitored by the supervising attorney. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. Mr. Grimes became a member of the Utah State Bar in 2005. 
2. In June 2005, Mr. Bill Riordan hired Mr. Grimes to represent him in a 
discrimination case. Mr. Riordan was Mr. Grimes' first client. 
3. At the time, Mr. Grimes worked for attorney J. Kent Holland. 
4. Mr. Riordan paid Mr. Grimes a $10,000 retainer, which was placed in Mr. 
Holland's attorney trust account. 
5. Mr. Grimes left Mr. Holland's firm sometime iri 2006. 
6. Mr. Riordan indicated he wanted to continue working with Mr. Grimes, so Mr. 
Grimes retrieved Mr. Riordan's file from Mr. Holland. 
7. On June 9, 2006, Mr. Holland's secretary gave Mr. Grimes a check in the amount 
of $7,070. 
8. The Memo line of the check bore Mr. Riordan's name, but Mr. Grimes believed 
some portion of the money was owed to him by Mr. Holland for Mr. Grimes' 
work on other cases. (R. 174-175.) 
9. Mr. Grimes failed to communicate with Mr. Riordan from approximately January 
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2007 to December 2007. 
10. During that time, Mr. Grimes experienced a number of personal and financial 
problems. 
11. Mr. Grimes did not effectively pursue Mr. Riordan's case, resulting in its 
dismissal. 
12. On December 17, 2007, Mr. Grimes sent a letter to Mr. Riordan explaining the 
situation and apologizing for not pursuing the case more effectively. (R. 169.) 
13. Mr. Grimes then timely re-filed Mr. Riordan's case. (R. 177.) 
14. Mr. Grimes failed to return the $7,070 to Mr. Riordan, as Mr. Grimes believed he 
was owed the funds for services rendered to Mr. Riordan and in previous cases for 
Mr. Holland. 
15. On December 22, 2008, Mr. Riordan sent a letter to Mr. Grimes asking for an 
accounting of his retainer and requesting the unused portion be sent to his new 
attorney. 
16. The OPC filed a Notice of Informal Complaint (NOIC) on Mr. Grimes on January 
17,2008. 
17. Mr. Grimes did not respond to the NOIC. 
18. A hearing was held before a Screening Panel of the Ethics and Discipline 
Committee of the Utah State Bar on March 28, 2008. 
19. The Screening Panel directed the OPC to file a formal complaint against Mr. 
Grimes in the District Court in this matter. 
8 
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20. The District Court found that Mr. Grimes' mishandling of Mr. Riordan's retainer 
violated the following Rules of Professional Conduct: 1.2(a) (Scope of 
Representation); 1.3 (Diligence); 1.4(a) (Communication); 1.5(a) (Fees); 
8.4(a),(c), and (d) (Misconduct). 
21. The District Court concluded that the presumptive sanction for Mr. Grimes' 
conduct was disbarment, but recognized that this sanction could be reduced if 
there were compelling mitigating circumstances. 
22. The District Court found the following mitigating factors: 
a. Mr. Grimes had no prior record of discipline before the bar. 
b. Mr. Grimes had did not have experience in the practice of law before taking 
on Mr. Riordan's case, as he had only just received his license. 
c. Mr. Grimes faced emotional problems during the period of his misconduct. He 
experienced marital problems, extreme financial difficulties, depression, 
suicidal ideation, and the hospitalization and passing away of his infant child 
in a short span of time. 
d. Mr. Grimes has removed himself from the area of civil law and concentrates 
on criminal defense. 
e. Mr. Grimes now has a good reputation as a criminal defense attorney, is hard 
working, and is considered to be honest. 
f. Mr. Grimes no longer handles client funds. 
23. In light of the evidence presented, the District Court concluded that justice would 
9 
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not be served by disbarment. 
24. Instead, the District Court suspended Mr. Grimes from the practice of law for 
three years, with all but 181 days of the suspension stayed, and imposed probation 
subject to various terms. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court's decision to suspend Mr. Grimes, rather than disbar him, is consistent 
with established law. The district court correctly recognized that the presumptive sanction for 
Mr. Grimes' misconduct was disbarment, and also correctly recognized that this sanction can be 
reduced in light of compelling mitigating circumstances. The court found compelling mitigating 
circumstances in this case and appropriately reduced the sanction in the interest of justice. The 
OPC's argument that this runs contrary to established law is without merit, as no Utah court has 
specifically defined what mitigating factors are "compelling" enough to warrant departing from 
disbarment. Furthermore, Mr. Grimes' conduct is distinguishable from those cases in which 
disbarment has been imposed, and his mitigating factors are more numerous. Many out of state 
courts have imposed suspension rather than disbarment in cases with mitigating circumstances 
similar to those at issue. Finally, the district court correctly applied this Court's reasoning in 
Crawley to craft an appropriate sanction that takes into account all the circumstances of Mr. 
Grimes' case. Accordingly, Mr. Grimes asks the Court to uphold the ruling of the district court. 
10 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court's Decision to Reduce the Presumptive Sanction of 
Disbarment to a Lesser Sanction was Consistent with Established Law and 
Appropriate to Mr. Grimes' Individual Case. 
The presumptive standard for Mr. Grimes' actions under the Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions is disbarment, but this Court has repeatedly held that departure from this 
sanction maybe warranted in light of compelling mitigating circumstances. The district court 
expressly recognized this rule and correctly applied it, finding mitigating factors compelling 
enough to warrant imposing a three-year suspension rather than disbarment. Furthermore, the 
district court properly applied the reasoning of the Crawley decision to craft an appropriate 
sanction that serves the purposes of attorney discipline in Mr. Grimes' individual case. 
a. The District Court correctly recognized that departure from the 
presumptive disbarment sanction was warranted upon a finding of 
compelling mitigating circumstances. 
The OPC is correct that in cases of intentional misappropriation of client funds, the 
presumptive sanction is disbarment. See Brief of the Petitioner/Appellant at p. 6; Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions Rule 14-605; Babilis, 951 P.2d at 216. The key word, however, is 
"presumptive." Rule 14-605, cited by the OPC as the rule requiring disbarment in this case, 
begins by explaining "Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer . . ," suggesting a 
degree of flexibility. See Rule 14-605(a) (emphasis added). Moreover, Rule 14-602, which sets 
out the framework for using the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, states the rules 
"permit[] flexibility and creativity in assigning sanctions in particular cases of lawyer 
11 
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misconduct" and are "designed to promote consideration of all factors relevant to imposing the 
appropriate level of sanction in an individual case" See Rule 14-602(d) (emphasis added). To 
that end, the rules provide a procedure for departing from the presumptive sanction in light of 
mitigating or aggravating circumstances. See Rule 14-607; Babilis, 951 P.2d at 215. Finally, this 
Court has emphasized: 
[AJlthough they are extremely useful guidelines and will be accorded deference in 
the vast majority of cases, this court is not restricted by the Rules of Professional 
Conduct in evaluating whether an attorney should be disbarred. Rather, [it] 
examine[s] all relevant facts and circumstances in attempting to determine what 
punishment, if any, is appropriate to deter similar conduct and to protect the 
public. 
In re Discipline of Harding, 2004 UT 100, \ 22 104 P.3d 1220, 1225 (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, although the presumptive sanction for misappropriation of funds is disbarment, that 
presumption is far from dispositive. 
In each case cited by the OPC where disbarment was ordered for misappropriation of 
funds, the court emphasized that "significant" or "compelling" mitigating circumstances could 
warrant departure from that presumptive sanction. See Babilis, 951 P.2d at 216; Matter of 
Discipline oflnce, 957 P.2d 1233, 1238 (Utah 1998); In re Discipline ofEnnenga, 2001 UT 111, 
H 10, 37 3 P.3d 1150, 1154; In re Discipline of Johnson, 2001 UT 110, If 9, 48 P.3d 881, 884. 
Therefore, the OPC's contention that "the district court did not have discretion to reduce the 
sanction in this case" is without merit. The caselaw expressly gives the court permission to 
reduce the sanction in light of compelling mitigating circumstances, and Judge Dever correctly 
annunciated this standard before considering the mitigating circumstances in this case. See Order 
12 
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of Sanction at p. 9 ("Pursuant to the standards, the intentional misappropriation of a client's 
funds will result in disbarment absent 'truly compelling mitigating circumstances.'") 
b. The District Court correctly found compelling mitigating circumstances 
to warrant departing from the presumptive sanction. 
1. Mr. Grimes' Mitigating; Factors 
After correctly annunciating the standard for departing from presumptive disbarment in 
cases of misappropriation, the district court recognized a number of compelling mitigating 
circumstances in this case. 
First, Mr. Riordan was Mr. Grimes' very first client. Mr. Grimes had little experience in 
the practice of law prior to handling Mr. Riordan's funds. He had no prior experience with 
employment discrimination cases, like Mr. Riordan's. (R. 164.). Due to his lack of experience, 
Mr. Grimes had to make extra effort to diligently research every aspect of the case before 
performing work for Mr. Riordan. (R. 164.) This contributed to the delay in pursuing Mr. 
Riordan's case. Mr. Grimes informed Mr. Riordan of his lack of prior experience in such matters, 
but Mr. Riordan chose to continue to be represented by Mr. Grimes, even after he had left Mr. 
Holland's employ 
Second, Mr. Grimes had no record of prior discipline before the bar. 
Third, Mr. Grimes suffered a number of personal problems during the period of 
misconduct. During his time working for Mr. Holland, Mr. Grimes was rarely paid for his work. 
(See R. 351:78:15-18.) This led to extreme financial hardship. Mr. Grimes made $13,000 in one 
year, while he had five children including a newborn baby, and his wife was not working. (R. 
13 
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351:78:21-23.) Mr. Grimes borrowed money from his brother for living expenses and to cover 
rent on a new office for his private practice. (R. 164, 167.) During this time, Mr. Grimes left Mr. 
Holland's employ and took on Mr. Riordan's case. Mr. Grimes' first months as a solo 
practitioner were no kinder, however. He had a hard time finding clients and income. At 
Christmas, Mr. Grimes was unable to afford presents for his children. (R. 167.) 
Mr. Grimes' financial problems were compounded by troubles at home. He so dreaded 
discussing finances with his wife that he began to sleep elsewhere. (R. 168.) He and his wife 
entered into marriage counseling, and Mr. Grimes sought treatment for his own depression. (R. 
351:79:7-14.) He broke his ankle and had to cover hospital bills. (R. 168.) Worst of all, Mr. 
Grimes' youngest son was born with pneumonia and hospitalized in the intensive care unit for 
nearly a month. (R. 164, 174-5.) As a result of the personal, emotional, and financial troubles 
weighing on him, Mr. Grimes became severely depressed. (R. 168.) He even contemplated 
suicide (R. 168.) Mr. Grimes personal, financial, and emotional difficulties coincided with the 
period where he failed to keep in touch with Mr. Riordan. (R. 3 51:81:1 -13.) 
Fourth, Mr. Grimes had developed a good reputation for hard honest work in the field of 
criminal defense since handling Mr. Riordan's case. At Mr. Grimes' sanction hearing, a number 
of attorneys testified to his sterling reputation as a lawyer in the criminal defense bar. (See R. 
312; see also R. 351:13-69.) Mr. Grimes has also become a pillar of the defense community 
through his volunteer work. He serves on the legislative committee of the United Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers (UACDL), gives CLE presentations on victims' rights in domestic 
violence cases, sits on a panel that provides free legal advice to victims of domestic violence, and 
14 
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often takes cases pro bono or on a reduced fee. (R. 351:96-98.) 
Fifth, Mr. Grimes has made interim reform to the way he practices law. He has removed 
himself completely from the practice of civil law in the wake of his misconduct and no longer 
handles client funds. (R. 351:98-99.) Mr. Grimes has also learned a lot more about how to 
practice law since his mishandling of the Riordan matter. He no longer falls into patterns of 
avoidance, and he has a support network to contact in the rare instance where he does not know 
how to handle a case. (R. 3 51:100-101.) 
Finally, Mr. Grimes expressed remorse by admitting to his misdeeds, that he was not 
honest with Mr. Riordan, that he has no excuse for his conduct, that he was morally and ethically 
wrong, and that he owes Mr. Riordan $7,070 plus interest. See Order of Sanction at pp. 9-10. Mr. 
Grimes understands that he was wrong to let his disputes with Mr. Holland over finances affect 
Mr. Riordan. (R. 351:101.) 
2. Mr. Grimes' case is distinguishable from Utah 
misappropriations cases where disbarment has been issued. 
Although a handful of cases have repeated the rule that presumptive disbarment for 
misappropriation of funds may be overcome by compelling mitigating circumstances, no Utah 
case has specifically defined a set of circumstances that would be considered compelling enough 
to warrant departure. Nonetheless, Mr. Grimes' misconduct is distinguishable from each case 
where disbarment was issued, including those cited by the OPC. In each case, the misconduct 
was more severe than that of Mr. Grimes and the mitigating circumstances less compelling. 
The OPC relies on Matter of Discipline ofBabilis, 951 P.2d 207. In that case, Babilis 
15 
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misrepresented himself as an expert in probate law despite having little experience in the field. 
See id. at 208. He also set himself up both as personal representative of his client's estate and as 
the attorney for an action involving that estate, a clear conflict of interest. See id. at 210. 
Ultimately, he misappropriated a total of $78,659.43 from his client's estate. See id. He covered 
his misdeeds with dishonest billing practices and also lied to the probate court as to the extent of 
his client's assets. See id. The Court found "the record is replete with examples of deceit, 
dishonesty, and misrepresentation, all motivated by Babilis1 desire to enrich himself." See id. at 
216. Additionally, the conduct was part of "an established pattern of misconduct that 
encompassed not only the [present] case but also his dealings with other clients, so that this was 
one of multiple instances of misconduct." See id. Notably, the district court in Babilis found no 
mitigating factors to justify departing from the presumptive sanction. See id. at p. 216, fh 19. 
Mr. Grimes' misconduct was much less severe than that of Babilis. Babilis 
misappropriated more than ten times the amount of money as Mr. Grimes. Babilis engaged in a 
pattern of deceit before his client and the court to cover his misdeeds, while Mr. Grimes stopped 
communicating with his client but did not continue to deceive him for additional financial gain. 
Babilis's misconduct was part of a pattern that encompassed multiple cases and dealings with 
other clients, while Mr. Grimes' mishandling of funds was a one-time occurrence in the 
beginning of his career. Finally, the court in Babilis found no mitigating circumstances sufficient 
to warrant departure from the presumptive sanction. The district court in Mr. Grimes' case 
enumerated several such factors, described above. While Babilis did present evidence of personal 
and emotional difficulties, the court was unwilling to treat them as mitigating because "those 
16 
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problems were of Mr. Babilis' own making" and did not excuse his behavior. See id. Here, in 
contrast, Mr. Grimes was dealing with the hospitalization of his infant child and depression, 
external problems that were not of his own making. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum is In re Discipline of Johnson. 48 P.3d 881 (Utah 
2001). There, Mr. Johnson's misconduct was admittedly more similar to that of Mr. Grimes. Mr. 
Johnson refused to return an unused portion of a client's retainer in the amount of $28,880 and 
converted it to his personal use. See id. at 883. Mr. Johnson also allegedly settled a case without 
his client's permission, which caused the dispute over the retainer. See id. The Court recognized 
that Mr. Johnson's conduct was less severe than that of other attorneys who had been disbarred 
for misappropriating funds, but held "disbarment was the appropriate remedy under our case law 
because there were no substantial mitigating circumstances." See id. at 884 (emphasis added). 
Mr. Johnson's case represents the least severe instance of misappropriation for which the 
Utah Supreme Court has upheld disbarment, and Mr. Grimes' misconduct was significantly less 
egregious. Mr. Johnson misappropriated more than four times more money than Mr. Grimes and 
continued to dispute that his client was owed the money even after disciplinary action was 
initiated. Furthermore, the district court in Johnson found no substantial mitigating factors and, 
indeed, cited the lack of mitigating factors as the reason disbarment was appropriate despite the 
relative lack of severity of Mr. Johnson's conduct. See id. at 884. Here, in contrast, the court 
enumerated several mitigating factors it considered significant enough to warrant departure from 
the presumptive sanction. 
Accordingly, although this Court has never stated a bright line rule for what mitigating 
17 
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circumstances would be considered compelling enough to warrant departing from disbarment in 
a misappropriation case, Mr. Grimes' misconduct, while serious, falls below even the least 
severe instance of misappropriation for which this Court has upheld disbarment. Moreover, the 
numerous significant mitigating circumstances relied on by the district court set Mr. Grimes' case 
apart from other precedent where fewer or no significant mitigating factors were found. 
3. Mr. Grimes' case is similar to misappropriation cases from 
foreign jurisdictions where suspension was imposed. 
A number of courts in foreign jurisdictions have imposed suspension rather than 
disbarment when a lawyer engaged in misconduct similar to that of Mr. Grimes. For example, in 
Edwards v. State Bar of California, 801 P.2d 396 (Cal. 1990), Mr. Edwards, an attorney with no 
prior record of discipline before the bar, misappropriated approximately $3,000 of his client's 
money from a trust fund in order to save his own home from foreclosure. See id. at 398-9. When 
Mr. Edwards' client tried to deposit a check drawing on the trust, it bounced. See id. at 398. Mr. 
Edwards informed his client that he had drawn from the account and eventually repaid the 
money, but the delay caused his client harm in that she was unable to start a business while the 
money was missing. See id. The disciplinary hearing panel found that Mr. Edwards had failed to 
maintain proper trust account records and to promptly repay his client. See id. at 399. The 
Supreme Court separately concluded that Mr. Edward's conduct amounted to willful 
misappropriation. See id. at 401. In mitigation, Mr. Edwards testified to his financial difficulties 
at the time of the misappropriation and that he had ceased all comingling of funds and now 
employed a certified public accountant to manage his trust account. See id. at 399. 
18 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The California Supreme Court reiterated the rule that the usual penalty for willful 
misappropriation was disbarment. See id. at 402. But the court also cautioned that "'willful 
misappropriation' covers a broad range of conduct varying significantly in the degree of 
culpability", and "extenuating circumstances" or "compelling mitigating circumstances relating 
to the attorney's background or character or to unusual difficulties the attorney was experiencing 
at the time" could be sufficient to warrant a lesser punishment. See id. In Mr. Edwards' case, the 
Court held disbarment was unnecessary to serve the purposes of attorney discipline. See id. at 
403. "Petitioner had not been disciplined before, and therefore . . . we have no evidence that a 
sanction short of disbarment is inadequate to deter future misconduct and protect the public." See 
id. Additionally, Mr. Edwards had repaid the money owed, been candid and cooperative 
throughout the proceedings, and voluntarily took steps to improve his management of client 
funds in the wake of his misconduct. See id. Accordingly, the Court held suspension was 
sufficient to protect the public, the courts, and the standards of the legal profession. See id. 
Mr. Grimes' case is similar to Mr. Edwards' in a number of respects. Neither attorney had 
a prior record of discipline before the bar, and the amount of misappropriated funds in each case 
was comparably low. Also, Mr. Grimes, like Mr. Edwards, has taken numerous voluntary steps to 
correct his behavior, including removing himself from civil law and the management of client 
funds all together. Although California courts have not recognized the "compelling mitigating 
circumstances" test as a hard-line rule in misappropriation cases, the Edwards court did start with 
a presumption of disbarment before considering the "extenuating circumstances" that made 
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suspension more appropriate. See id. at 402-403. Accordingly, it applied a similar test to Mr. 
Edwards' misconduct as the district court in this case applied to Mr. Grimes'. 
In contrast to Mr. Edwards, however, Mr. Grimes suffered an extreme amount of 
emotional turmoil at the time of his misconduct, resulting from marital difficulties, financial 
hardship, the hospitalization of his infant son, and severe depression, which further serves to 
mitigate his actions. In the Washington D.C. case/ft re Cappell, 866 A.2d 784 (D.C. 2004), Mr. 
Cappell used funds from his clients' trust accounts for business and personal expenses. See id. at 
784. At the time, Mr. Cappell suffered form major depression caused by the breakup of his 
marriage and significant health problems. The review Board found that Mr. Cappell's 
misconduct would not have occurred but for his depression. See id. at 785. Mr. Cappell had 
candidly admitted to and taken responsibility for his actions, and he was seeking treatment for the 
depression. See id. He had also begun working with a financial monitor to avoid further 
mismanaging his trust funds. See id. Considering those mitigating circumstances, the Board 
issued probation instead of disbarment, and the D.C. Court of Appeals upheld the ruling. See id. 
The Court relied on a line of cases involving alcoholism that held departure from disbarment was 
warranted where an attorney's misconduct was caused by alcohol abuse, if the attorney had since 
gained control of his alcoholism sufficient to suggest the misconduct would not occur again. See 
id.; see also In Re Kersey, 520 A.2d 321 (D.C. 1987). The Court deemed the same reasoning 
appropriate in cases where severe depression had caused the misconduct. See id. 
That reasoning applies equally well to Mr. Grimes' case. Mr. Grimes was suffering from 
severe depression when he engaged in his misconduct. Mr. Grimes emotional problems were so 
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severe that he had even considered suicide. (R. 168.) The district court expressly cited evidence 
of Mr. Grimes' depression and the hospitalization of his infant son as mitigating circumstances 
weighing in favor of departure from disbarment. See Order of Sanction at p. 10. Mr. Grimes, like 
Mr. Cappell, has sought counseling to address his emotional issues and prevent further instances 
of misconduct. The district court did not expressly find that Mr. Grimes' emotional turmoil 
caused his misconduct, as would be required under D.C. caselaw, but Utah has never applied 
such a causation standard. Instead, the Standards for Lawyer Sanctions specifically mention 
"personal and emotional problems" as a mitigating circumstance that may "justify a reduction in 
the degree of discipline used." See Rule 14-607(b)(3). The district court correctly identified Mr. 
Grimes' emotional issues at the time of his misconduct as compelling mitigating circumstances 
weighing in favor of departure from the presumptive sanction. 
c. The District Court properly considered Crawley and the interest of 
justice in imposing its sanction. 
The district court applied reasoning from this Court's decision in In re Discipline of 
Crawley, 2007 UT 44, 164 P.3d 1232, when crafting its sanction in this case. The OPC argues 
the court's invocation of Crawley indicates it departed from the "compelling mitigating 
circumstances" test described above, and that any use of Crawley in crafting sanctions is not 
allowed when willful misappropriation is at issue. See Brief of the Petitioner/Appellant at p. 13. 
Both of the OPC's arguments related to Crawley are without merit. 
First, the OPC argues the district court departed from the "compelling mitigating 
circumstances" test by relying on Crawley to craft its sanction. The district court's order, 
21 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
however, indicates the opposite. Judge Dever's order explains that the Standards presume 
disbarment absent "truly compelling mitigating circumstances" in cases of misappropriation and, 
indeed, cites to In re Ennega when explaining this rule—the same case relied on by the OPC in 
much of its Brief. See Order of Sanction at p. 9. The court then goes on to identify the mitigating 
circumstances at issue in Mr. Grimes' case, suggesting the court was applying those mitigating 
circumstances to the test it had just annunciated. See Order of Sanction at p. 9-11. The OPC is 
correct that the court never expressly states that it has found those circumstances "truly 
compelling," but the logic of the court's order is clear. First, the district court explains that the 
presumptive sanction in misappropriation cases is disbarment absent "compelling mitigating 
circumstances;" then it lists a series of mitigating circumstances weighing against disbarment; 
and finally, it concludes by departing from disbarment and issuing suspension and probation with 
terms tailored to serve the interest of justice. A sensible reading of that order suggests that Judge 
Dever considered the mitigating factors he listed sufficiently compelling to meet the test. The 
OPC would have this Court believe that, by invoking Crawley in the Conclusion of its order, the 
district court had somehow forgotten the test it annunciated and applied just two pages prior. 
It is much easier to believe that the court deliberately used Crawley in conjunction with 
the "compelling mitigating circumstances" test to craft an appropriate individualized sanction for 
Mr. Grimes' particular case. Indeed, this is the very purpose for which the Crawley decision was 
intended. There, the OPC challenged the district court's ability to issue probation in cases calling 
for more severe forms of discipline and asked this Court to adopt specific guidelines detailing 
when probation could be used. See Crawley, 2007 UT 44 ^ 21. Specifically, the OPC asked the 
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Court to deny probation in cases where the misconduct was "knowing or intentional," such as 
this one. The Court declined to do so, holding: 
We are satisfied-indeed pleased-with the discretion currently being exercised by 
district courts in sanctioning attorneys for misconduct. It is a delicate and often 
difficult task to craft sanctions appropriate for individual attorneys, no two of 
which have engaged in the same misconduct under the same aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances. The standards permit flexibility and creativity in 
assigning sanctions, and the district courts have embraced this approach. 
Our district court judges do a remarkable job of fulfilling a stated purpose of the 
standards-protecting the public and the administration of justice-while still 
providing the opportunity, when appropriate, for attorney rehabilitation. Were we 
to limit the circumstances under which probation is available, we would very 
likely undermine the ability of the district courts to so effectively maintain this 
balance. 
Id. at f 22 (internal quotations omitted). 
The Court in Crawley expressly declined to place any limit on the circumstances under which 
probation might be an appropriate part of an individualized sanction. Accordingly, the OPC's 
contention that Crawley "is not correctly applicable to misappropriation cases" is without merit 
and contrary to the Court's ruling. Indeed, as Crawley was decided after the misappropriation 
cases relied on by the OPC, the Court would likely have made it clear if it intended Crawley to 
stand separately from those other cases. It did not do so. 
The district court, then, was entirely justified in using Crawley's "triangle of justice, 
protection, and rehabilitation" in crafting its sanction in this case, after detailing the mitigating 
circumstances that warranted departure from presumptive disbarment. The district court 
appropriately ordered suspension and used Crawley's logic to craft probationary terms that 
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protect the public while still giving Mr. Grimes a chance to rehabilitate himself. The 
probationary terms require Mr. Grimes to report to a supervising attorney approved by the OPC, 
who will monitor all retainers received by Mr. Grimes and report to the court and the OPC 
monthly for six months and quarterly thereafter on Mr. Grimes' rehabilitation. It is difficult to 
fathom how Mr. Grimes could be a danger to the public under these probationary terms, nor what 
the public would gain from his disbarment. 
CONCLUSION 
Although Mr. Grimes misconduct was serious, it is tempered by a number of mitigating 
circumstances that distinguish his case from those where disbarment has been ordered. The 
district court recognized the specific circumstances weighing on Mr. Grimes and imposed a 
sanction tailored to meet them. The district court's sanction appropriately serves the purposes of 
attorney discipline and honors the prior rulings of this Court. Accordingly, Mr. Grimes requests 
this Court uphold the district court's ruling. 
DATED this 4th day of August, 2011. 
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